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Tetragon Observability Policies

Library of policies that implement Tetragon observability and runtime enforcement. mechanisms.

    Index

    Security Sensitive Events

    System Activity

    Networking

    Observability Policies

    Binary Execution in /tmp

    Description

    Monitor execution of a binary in the /tmp directory.

    Use Case

    Preventing execution of executables in /tmp is a common best-practice as several canned exploits rely on writing and then executing malicious binaries in the /tmp directory. A common best-practice to enforce this is to mount the /tmp filesystem with the noexec flag. This observability policy is used to monitor for violations of this best practice.

    Policy

    No policy needs to be loaded, standard process execution observability is sufficient.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_exec != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary | contains("/tmp/")) | "\(.time) \(.process_exec.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_exec.process.pod.name) \(.process_exec.process.binary) \(.process_exec.process.arguments)"'

    Example Output

    "2023-10-31T18:44:22.777962637Z default/xwing /tmp/nc ebpf.io 1234"

    sudo Invocation Monitoring

    Description

    Monitor sudo invocations

    Use Case

    sudo is used to run executables with particular privileges. Creating a audit log of sudo invocations is a common best-practice.

    Policy

    No policy needs to be loaded, standard process execution observability is sufficient.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_exec != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary | contains("sudo")) | "\(.time) \(.process_exec.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_exec.process.binary) \(.process_exec.process.arguments)"'

    Example Output

    "2023-10-31T19:03:35.273111185Z null /usr/bin/sudo -i"

    Privileges Escalation via SUID Binary Execution

    Description

    Monitor execution of SUID “Set User ID” binaries.

    Use Case

    The “Set User Identity” and “Set Group Identity” are permission flags. When set on a binary file, the binary will execute with the permissions of the owner or group associated with the executable file, rather than the user executing it. Usually it is used to run programs with elevated privileges to perform specific tasks.

    Detecting the execution of setuid and setgid binaries is a common best-practice as attackers may abuse such binaries, or even create them during an exploit for subsequent execution.

    Requirement

    Tetragon must run with the Process Credentials visibility enabled, please refer to Enable Process Credentials documentation.

    Policy

    No policy needs to be loaded, standard process execution observability is sufficient.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_exec != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary_properties != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary_properties.setuid != null or .process_exec.process.binary_properties.setgid != null) | "\(.time) \(.process_exec.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_exec.process.pod.name) \(.process_exec.process.binary) \(.process_exec.process.arguments) uid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.uid) euid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.euid)  gid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.gid) egid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.egid) binary_properties=\(.process_exec.process.binary_properties)"'

    Example Output

    "2024-02-05T20:20:50.828208246Z null null /usr/bin/sudo id uid=1000 euid=0  gid=1000 egid=1000 binary_properties={\"setuid\":0,\"privileges_changed\":[\"PRIVILEGES_RAISED_EXEC_FILE_SETUID\"]}"
"2024-02-05T20:20:57.008655978Z null null /usr/bin/wall hello uid=1000 euid=1000  gid=1000 egid=5 binary_properties={\"setgid\":5}"
"2024-02-05T20:21:00.116297664Z null null /usr/bin/su --help uid=1000 euid=0  gid=1000 egid=1000 binary_properties={\"setuid\":0,\"privileges_changed\":[\"PRIVILEGES_RAISED_EXEC_FILE_SETUID\"]}"

    Privileges Escalation via File Capabilities Execution

    Description

    Monitor execution of binaries with file capabilities.

    Use Case

    File capabilities allow the binary execution to acquire more privileges to perform specific tasks. They are stored in the extended attribute part of the binary on the file system. They can be set using the setcap tool.

    For further reference, please check capabilities man page; section File capabilities.

    Detecting the execution of file capabilities binaries is a common best-practice, since they cross privilege boundaries which make them a suitable target for attackers. Such binaries are also used by attackers to hide their privileges after a successful exploit.

    Requirement

    Tetragon must run with the Process Credentials visibility enabled, please refer to Enable Process Credentials documentation.

    Policy

    No policy needs to be loaded, standard process execution observability is sufficient.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_exec != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary_properties != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary_properties.privileges_changed != null) | "\(.time) \(.process_exec.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_exec.process.pod.name) \(.process_exec.process.binary) \(.process_exec.process.arguments) uid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.uid) euid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.euid)  gid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.gid) egid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.egid) caps=\(.process_exec.process.cap) binary_properties=\(.process_exec.process.binary_properties)"''

    Example Output

    "2024-02-05T20:49:39.551528684Z null null /usr/bin/ping ebpf.io uid=1000 euid=1000  gid=1000 egid=1000 caps={\"permitted\":[\"CAP_NET_RAW\"],\"effective\":[\"CAP_NET_RAW\"]} binary_properties={\"privileges_changed\":[\"PRIVILEGES_RAISED_EXEC_FILE_CAP\"]}"

    Privileges Escalation via Setuid System Calls

    Description

    Monitor execution of the setuid() system calls family.

    Use Case

    The setuid() and setgid() system calls family allow to change the effective user ID and group ID of the calling process.

    Detecting setuid() and setgid() calls that set the user ID or group ID to root is a common best-practice to identify when privileges are raised.

    Policy

    The privileges-raise.yaml monitors the various interfaces of setuid() and setgid() to root.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_kprobe != null) | select(.process_kprobe.policy_name | test("privileges-raise")) | select(.process_kprobe.function_name | test("__sys_")) | "\(.time) \(.process_kprobe.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_kprobe.process.pod.name) \(.process_kprobe.process.binary) \(.process_kprobe.process.arguments) \(.process_kprobe.function_name) \(.process_kprobe.args)"'

    Example Output

    "2024-02-05T15:23:24.734543507Z null null /usr/local/sbin/runc --root /run/containerd/runc/k8s.io --log /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392/log.json --log-format json --systemd-cgroup exec --process /tmp/runc-process2191655094 --detach --pid-file /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392/2d56fcb136b07310685c9e188be7a49d32dc0e45a10d3fe14bc550e6ce2aa5cb.pid 024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392 __sys_setuid [{\"int_arg\":0}]"
"2024-02-05T15:23:24.734550826Z null null /usr/local/sbin/runc --root /run/containerd/runc/k8s.io --log /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392/log.json --log-format json --systemd-cgroup exec --process /tmp/runc-process2191655094 --detach --pid-file /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392/2d56fcb136b07310685c9e188be7a49d32dc0e45a10d3fe14bc550e6ce2aa5cb.pid 024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392 __sys_setgid [{\"int_arg\":0}]"
"2024-02-05T15:23:28.731719921Z null null /usr/bin/sudo id __sys_setresgid [{\"int_arg\":-1},{\"int_arg\":0},{\"int_arg\":-1}]"
"2024-02-05T15:23:28.731752014Z null null /usr/bin/sudo id __sys_setresuid [{\"int_arg\":-1},{\"int_arg\":0},{\"int_arg\":-1}]"
"2024-02-05T15:23:30.803946368Z null null /usr/bin/sudo id __sys_setgid [{\"int_arg\":0}]"
"2024-02-05T15:23:30.805118893Z null null /usr/bin/sudo id __sys_setresuid [{\"int_arg\":0},{\"int_arg\":0},{\"int_arg\":0}]"

    Privileges Escalation via Unprivileged User Namespaces

    Description

    Monitor creation of User namespaces by unprivileged.

    Use Case

    User namespaces isolate security-related identifiers like user IDs, group IDs credentials and capabilities. A process can have a normal unprivileged user ID outside a user namespace while at the same time having a privileged user ID 0 (root) inside its own user namespace.

    When an unprivileged process creates a new user namespace beside having a privileged user ID, it will also receive the full set of capabilities. User namespaces are feature to replace setuid and setgid binaries, and to allow applications to create sandboxes. However, they expose lot of kernel interfaces that are normally restricted to privileged (root). Such interfaces may increase the attack surface and get abused by attackers in order to perform privileges escalation exploits.

    Unfortunatly, a report from Google shows up that 44% of the exploits required unprivileged user namespaces to perform chain privileges escalation. Therfore, detecting the creation of user namespaces by unprivileged is a common best-practice to identify such cases.

    Policy

    The privileges-raise.yaml monitors the creation of user namespaces by unprivileged.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_kprobe != null) | select(.process_kprobe.policy_name | test("privileges-raise")) | select(.process_kprobe.function_name | test("create_user_ns")) | "\(.time) \(.process_kprobe.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_kprobe.process.pod.name) \(.process_kprobe.process.binary) \(.process_kprobe.process.arguments) \(.process_kprobe.function_name) \(.process_kprobe.process.process_credentials)"'

    Example Output

    "2024-02-05T22:08:15.033035972Z null null /usr/bin/unshare -rUfp create_user_ns {\"uid\":1000,\"gid\":1000,\"euid\":1000,\"egid\":1000,\"suid\":1000,\"sgid\":1000,\"fsuid\":1000,\"fsgid\":1000}"

    Privileges Change via Capset System Call

    Description

    Monitor execution of the capset() system call.

    Use Case

    The capset() system call allows to change the process capabilities.

    Detecting capset() calls that set the effective, inheritable and permitted capabilities to non zero is a common best-practice to identify processes that could raise their privileges.

    Policy

    The privileges-raise.yaml monitors capset() calls that do not drop capabilities.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_kprobe != null) | select(.process_kprobe.policy_name | test("privileges-raise")) | select(.process_kprobe.function_name | test("capset")) | "\(.time) \(.process_kprobe.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_kprobe.process.pod.name) \(.process_kprobe.process.binary) \(.process_kprobe.process.arguments) \(.process_kprobe.function_name) \(.process_kprobe.args[3]) \(.process_kprobe.args[1])"'

    Example Output

    "2024-02-05T21:12:03.579600653Z null null /usr/bin/sudo id security_capset {\"cap_permitted_arg\":\"000001ffffffffff\"} {\"cap_effective_arg\":\"000001ffffffffff\"}"
"2024-02-05T21:12:04.754115578Z null null /usr/local/sbin/runc --root /run/containerd/runc/k8s.io --log /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392/log.json --log-format json --systemd-cgroup exec --process /tmp/runc-process2431693392 --detach --pid-file /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392/9403a57a3061274de26cad41915bad5416d4d484c9e142b22193b74e19a252c5.pid 024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392 security_capset {\"cap_permitted_arg\":\"000001ffffffffff\"} {\"cap_effective_arg\":\"000001ffffffffff\"}"
"2024-02-05T21:12:12.836813445Z null null /usr/bin/runc --root /var/run/docker/runtime-runc/moby --log /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/moby/c7bc6bf80f07bf6475e507f735866186650137bca2be796d6a39e22b747b97e9/log.json --log-format json --systemd-cgroup create --bundle /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/moby/c7bc6bf80f07bf6475e507f735866186650137bca2be796d6a39e22b747b97e9 --pid-file /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/moby/c7bc6bf80f07bf6475e507f735866186650137bca2be796d6a39e22b747b97e9/init.pid c7bc6bf80f07bf6475e507f735866186650137bca2be796d6a39e22b747b97e9 security_capset {\"cap_permitted_arg\":\"00000000a80425fb\"} {\"cap_effective_arg\":\"00000000a80425fb\"}"
"2024-02-05T21:12:14.774175889Z null null /usr/local/sbin/runc --root /run/containerd/runc/k8s.io --log /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392/log.json --log-format json --systemd-cgroup exec --process /tmp/runc-process2888400204 --detach --pid-file /run/containerd/io.containerd.runtime.v2.task/k8s.io/024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392/d8b8598320fe3d874b901c70863f36233760b3e63650a2474f707cc51b4340f9.pid 024daa4cc70eb683355f6f67beda3012c65d64f479d958e421cd209738a75392 security_capset {\"cap_permitted_arg\":\"000001ffffffffff\"} {\"cap_effective_arg\":\"000001ffffffffff\"}"

    Fileless Execution

    Description

    Monitor the execution of binaries that exist exclusively as a computer memory-based artifact.

    Use Case

    Often attackers execute fileless binaries that reside only in memory rather than on the file system to cover their traces. On Linux this is possible with the help of memfd_create() and shared memory anonymous files. Therefore, detecting execution of such binaries that live only in RAM or backed by volatile storage is a common best-practice.

    Requirement

    Tetragon must run with the Process Credentials visibility enabled, please refer to Enable Process Credentials documentation.

    Policy

    No policy needs to be loaded, standard process execution observability is sufficient.

    Demo to reproduce

    You can use the exec-memfd.py python script as an example which will copy the binary /bin/true into an anonymous memory then execute it. The binary will not be linked on the file system.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_exec != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary_properties != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary_properties.file) | "\(.time) \(.process_exec.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_exec.process.pod.name) \(.process_exec.process.binary) \(.process_exec.process.arguments) uid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.uid) euid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.euid) binary_properties=\(.process_exec.process.binary_properties)"'

    Example Output

    "2024-02-14T15:17:48.758997159Z null null /proc/self/fd/3 null uid=1000 euid=1000 binary_properties={\"file\":{\"inode\":{\"number\":\"45021\",\"links\":0}}}"

    The output shows that the executed binary refers to a file descriptor /proc/self/fd/3 that it is not linked on the file system. The binary_properties includes an inode with zero links on the file system.

    Execution of Deleted Binaries

    Description

    Monitor the execution of deleted binaries.

    Use Case

    Malicious actors may open a binary, delete it from the file system to hide their traces then execute it. Detecting such executions is a good pratice.

    Requirement

    Tetragon must run with the Process Credentials visibility enabled, please refer to Enable Process Credentials documentation.

    Policy

    No policy needs to be loaded, standard process execution observability is sufficient.

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_exec != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary_properties != null) | select(.process_exec.process.binary_properties.file != null) | "\(.time) \(.process_exec.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_exec.process.pod.name) \(.process_exec.process.binary) \(.process_exec.process.arguments) uid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.uid) euid=\(.process_exec.process.process_credentials.euid) binary_properties=\(.process_exec.process.binary_properties)"'

    Example Output

    "2024-02-14T16:07:54.265540484Z null null /proc/self/fd/14 null uid=1000 euid=1000 binary_properties={\"file\":{\"inode\":{\"number\":\"4991635\",\"links\":0}}}"

    The output shows that the executed binary refers to a file descriptor /proc/self/fd/14 that it is not linked on the file system. The binary_properties includes an inode with zero links on the file system.

    eBPF Subsystem Interactions

    Description

    Audit BPF program loads and BPFFS interactions

    Use Case

    Understanding BPF programs loaded in a cluster and interactions between applications and programs can identify bugs and malicious or unexpected BPF activity.

    Policy

    bpf.yaml

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_kprobe != null) | select(.process_kprobe.function_name | test("bpf_check")) | "\(.time) \(.process_kprobe.process.binary) \(.process_kprobe.process.arguments) programType:\(.process_kprobe.args[0].bpf_attr_arg.ProgType) programInsn:\(.process_kprobe.args[0].bpf_attr_arg.InsnCnt)"

    Example Output

    "2023-11-01T02:56:54.926403604Z /usr/bin/bpftool prog list programType:BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER programInsn:2"

    Kernel Module Audit Trail

    Description

    Audit loading of kernel modules

    Use Case

    Understanding exactly what kernel modules are running in the cluster is crucial to understand attack surface and any malicious actors loading unexpected modules.

    Policy

    modules.yaml

    Example jq Filter

     jq 'select(.process_kprobe != null) | select(.process_kprobe.function_name | test("security_kernel_module_request"))  | "\(.time) \(.process_kprobe.process.binary) \(.process_kprobe.process.arguments) module:\(.process_kprobe.args[0].string_arg)"'

    Example Output

    "2023-11-01T04:11:38.390880528Z /sbin/iptables -A OUTPUT -m cgroup --cgroup 1 -j LOG module:ipt_LOG"

    Shared Library Loading

    Description

    Monitor loading of libraries

    Use Case

    Understanding the exact versions of shared libraries that binaries load and use is crucial to understand use of vulnerable or deprecated library versions or attacks such as shared library hijacking.

    Policy

    library.yaml

    Example jq Filter

    jq 'select(.process_loader != null) | "\(.time) \(.process_loader.process.pod.namespace) \(.process_loader.process.binary) \(.process_loader.process.arguments) \(.process_loader.path)"

    Example Output

    "2023-10-31T19:42:33.065233159Z default/xwing /usr/bin/curl https://ebpf.io /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.3"

    SSHd connection monitoring

    Description

    Monitor sessions to SSHd

    Use Case

    It is best practice to audit remote connections into a shell server.

    Policy

    sshd.yaml

    Example jq Filter

     jq 'select(.process_kprobe != null) | select(.process_kprobe.function_name | test("tcp_close")) |  "\(.time) \(.process_kprobe.process.binary) \(.process_kprobe.process.arguments) \(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.family) \(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.type)  \(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.protocol) \(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.saddr):\(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.sport)"'

    Example Output

    "2023-11-01T04:51:20.109146920Z /usr/sbin/sshd default/xwing AF_INET SOCK_STREAM IPPROTO_TCP 127.0.0.1:22"

    Outbound connections

    Description

    Monitor all cluster egress connections

    Use Case

    Connections made outside a Kubernetes cluster can be audited to provide insights into any unexpected or malicious reverse shells.

    Environment Variables

    PODCIDR=`kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{.items[*].spec.podCIDR}'`

    SERVICECIDR=$(gcloud container clusters describe ${NAME} --zone ${ZONE} | awk '/servicesIpv4CidrBlock/ { print $2; }')
    SERVICECIDR=$(kubectl describe pod -n kube-system kube-apiserver-kind-control-plane | awk -F= '/--service-cluster-ip-range/ {print $2; }')

    Policy

    egress.yaml

    Example jq Filter

     jq 'select(.process_kprobe != null) | select(.process_kprobe.function_name | test("tcp_connect")) | "\(.time) \(.process_kprobe.process.binary) \(.process_kprobe.process.arguments) \(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.saddr):\(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.sport) -> \(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.daddr):\(.process_kprobe.args[0].sock_arg.dport)"'

    Example Output

    "2023-11-01T05:25:14.837745007Z /usr/bin/curl http://ebpf.io 10.168.0.45:48272 -> 104.198.14.52:80"