3 - Hook points
Hook points for Tracing Policies and arguments description
Tetragon can hook into the kernel using kprobes and tracepoints, as well as in user-space
programs using uprobes. Users can configure these hook points using the correspodning sections of
the TracingPolicy specification (.spec). These hook points include arguments and return values
that can be specified using the args and returnArg fields as detailed in the following sections.
Kprobes
Kprobes enables you to dynamically hook into any kernel function and execute BPF code. Because
kernel functions might change across versions, kprobes are highly tied to your kernel version and,
thus, might not be portable across different kernels.
Conveniently, you can list all kernel symbols reading the /proc/kallsyms
file. For example to search for the write syscall kernel function, you can
execute sudo grep sys_write /proc/kallsyms, the output should be similar to
this, minus the architecture specific prefixes.
ffffdeb14ea712e0 T __arm64_sys_writev
ffffdeb14ea73010 T ksys_write
ffffdeb14ea73140 T __arm64_sys_write
ffffdeb14eb5a460 t proc_sys_write
ffffdeb15092a700 d _eil_addr___arm64_sys_writev
ffffdeb15092a740 d _eil_addr___arm64_sys_write
You can see that the exact name of the symbol for the write syscall on our
kernel version is __arm64_sys_write. Note that on x86_64, the prefix would
be __x64_ instead of __arm64_.
CautionKernel symbols contain an architecture specific prefix when they refer to
syscall symbols. To write portable tracing policies, i.e. policies that can run
on multiple architectures, just use the symbol name without the prefix.
For example, instead of writing call: "__arm64_sys_write" or call: "__x64_sys_write", just write call: "sys_write", Tetragon will adapt and add
the correct prefix based on the architecture of the underlying machine. Note
that the event generated as output currently includes the prefix.
In our example, we will explore a kprobe hooking into the
fd_install
kernel function. The fd_install kernel function is called each time a file
descriptor is installed into the file descriptor table of a process, typically
referenced within system calls like open or openat. Hooking fd_install
has its benefits and limitations, which are out of the scope of this guide.
spec:
kprobes:
- call: "fd_install"
syscall: false
Note Notice the
syscall field, specific to a
kprobe spec, with default value
false, that indicates whether Tetragon will hook a syscall or just a regular
kernel function. Tetragon needs this information because syscall and kernel
function use a
different ABI.
Kprobes calls can be defined independently in different policies,
or together in the same Policy. For example, we can define trace multiple
kprobes under the same tracing policy:
spec:
kprobes:
- call: "sys_read"
syscall: true
# [...]
- call: "sys_write"
syscall: true
# [...]
Tracepoints
Tracepoints are statically defined in the kernel and have the advantage of being stable across
kernel versions and thus more portable than kprobes.
To see the list of tracepoints available on your kernel, you can list them
using sudo ls /sys/kernel/tracing/events, the output should be similar
to this.
alarmtimer ext4 iommu page_pool sock
avc fib ipi pagemap spi
block fib6 irq percpu swiotlb
bpf_test_run filelock jbd2 power sync_trace
bpf_trace filemap kmem printk syscalls
bridge fs_dax kvm pwm task
btrfs ftrace libata qdisc tcp
cfg80211 gpio lock ras tegra_apb_dma
cgroup hda mctp raw_syscalls thermal
clk hda_controller mdio rcu thermal_power_allocator
cma hda_intel migrate regmap thermal_pressure
compaction header_event mmap regulator thp
cpuhp header_page mmap_lock rpm timer
cros_ec huge_memory mmc rpmh tlb
dev hwmon module rseq tls
devfreq i2c mptcp rtc udp
devlink i2c_slave napi sched vmscan
dma_fence initcall neigh scmi wbt
drm interconnect net scsi workqueue
emulation io_uring netlink signal writeback
enable iocost oom skb xdp
error_report iomap page_isolation smbus xhci-hcd
You can then choose the subsystem that you want to trace, and look the
tracepoint you want to use and its format. For example, if we choose the
netif_receive_skb tracepoints from the net subsystem, we can read its
format with sudo cat /sys/kernel/tracing/events/net/netif_receive_skb/format,
the output should be similar to the following.
name: netif_receive_skb
ID: 1398
format:
field:unsigned short common_type; offset:0; size:2; signed:0;
field:unsigned char common_flags; offset:2; size:1; signed:0;
field:unsigned char common_preempt_count; offset:3; size:1; signed:0;
field:int common_pid; offset:4; size:4; signed:1;
field:void * skbaddr; offset:8; size:8; signed:0;
field:unsigned int len; offset:16; size:4; signed:0;
field:__data_loc char[] name; offset:20; size:4; signed:0;
print fmt: "dev=%s skbaddr=%px len=%u", __get_str(name), REC->skbaddr, REC->len
Similarly to kprobes, tracepoints can also hook into system calls. For more
details, see the raw_syscalls and syscalls subysystems.
An example of tracepoints TracingPolicy could be the following, observing all
syscalls and getting the syscall ID from the argument at index 4:
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "raw-syscalls"
spec:
tracepoints:
- subsystem: "raw_syscalls"
event: "sys_enter"
args:
- index: 4
type: "int64"
Raw Tracepoints
Raw tracepoints allow same attachment as tracepoints, but allow access to raw
tracepoint arguments (compared to standard tracepoints that provide access to
arguments through tracepoint format).
Raw tracepoints are attach directly without the perf layer in the middle,
so should be bit faster than standard tracepoints.
Each tracepoint is defined in kernel with similar statement like following:
TRACE_EVENT(sched_process_exec,
TP_PROTO(struct task_struct *p, pid_t old_pid,
struct linux_binprm *bprm),
...
);
which defines sched:sched_process_exec tracepoint with arguments.
Raw tracepoints are configured by setting with raw spec tag.
apiversion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: tracingpolicy
metadata:
name: "rawtp"
spec:
tracepoints:
- subsystem: "sched"
event: "sched_process_exec"
raw: true
We can use raw tracepoint to attach the tracepoint and access above arguments
directly.
Following example stores 3rd argument:
apiversion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: tracingpolicy
metadata:
name: "rawtp"
spec:
tracepoints:
- subsystem: "sched"
event: "sched_process_exec"
raw: true
args:
- index: 2
type: "linux_binprm"
which is represented as path and permission data in the resulted event:
"subsys": "sched",
"event": "sched_process_exec",
"args": [
{
"linux_binprm_arg": {
"path": "/usr/bin/ls",
"permission": "rwxr-xr-x"
}
}
It’s also possible to resolve data from arguments with Resolve, like:
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "rawtp"
spec:
tracepoints:
- subsystem: "sched"
event: "sched_process_exec"
raw: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
resolve: "pid"
- index: 2
type: "linux_binprm"
which gives you pid field from first task_struct argument, resulting in following event data:
"subsys": "sched",
"event": "sched_process_exec",
"args": [
{
"int_arg": 938600
},
{
"linux_binprm_arg": {
"path": "/usr/bin/ls",
"permission": "rwxr-xr-x"
}
}
Uprobes
Uprobes are similar to kprobes, but they allow you to dynamically hook into any
user-space function and execute BPF code. Uprobes are also tied to the binary
version of the user-space program, so they may not be portable across different
versions or architectures.
To use uprobes, you need to specify the path to the executable or library file,
and the symbol of the function you want to probe. You can use tools like
objdump, nm, or readelf to find the symbol of a function in a binary
file. For example, to find the readline symbol in /bin/bash using nm, you
can run:
nm -D /bin/bash | grep readline
The output should look similar to this, with a few lines redacted:
[...]
000000000009f2b0 T pcomp_set_readline_variables
0000000000097e40 T posix_readline_initialize
00000000000d5690 T readline
00000000000d52f0 T readline_internal_char
00000000000d42d0 T readline_internal_setup
[...]
You can see in the nm output: first the symbol value, then the symbol type,
for the readline symbol T meaning that this symbol is in the text (code)
section of the binary, and finally the symbol name. This confirms that the
readline symbol is present in the /bin/bash binary and might be a function
name that we can hook with a uprobe.
You can define multiple uprobes in the same policy, or in different policies.
You can also combine uprobes with kprobes and tracepoints to get a
comprehensive view of the system behavior.
Here is an example of a policy that defines an uprobe for the readline
function in the bash executable, and applies it to all processes that use the
bash binary:
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "example-uprobe"
spec:
uprobes:
- path: "/bin/bash"
symbols:
- "readline"
This example shows how to use uprobes to hook into the readline function
running in all the bash shells.
USDTs
Tetragon allows to attach and monitor USDT (User Statically-Defined Tracing) probes.
You can display available USDT probes directly by checking ELF binary stapsdt notes with:
readelf -n ..../contrib/tester-progs/usdt
...
stapsdt 0x00000024 NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
Provider: test
Name: usdt0
Location: 0x000000000000115b, Base: 0x0000000000002004, Semaphore: 0x0000000000004030
Arguments:
stapsdt 0x00000043 NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
Provider: test
Name: usdt3
Location: 0x0000000000001177, Base: 0x0000000000002004, Semaphore: 0x0000000000004032
Arguments: -4@-12(%rbp) -8@-8(%rbp) 8@%rax
stapsdt 0x00000084 NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
Provider: test
Name: usdt12
Location: 0x000000000000120a, Base: 0x0000000000002004, Semaphore: 0x0000000000004034
Arguments: -4@-12(%rbp) -4@%edi -8@-8(%rbp) -8@%r8 -4@$5 -8@%r9 8@%rax 8@%r10 -4@$-9 -2@%dx -2@%cx -1@%sil
Or use tetra to generate tracing policy for available USDT probes with:
tetra tracingpolicy generate usdts --binary ..../contrib/tester-progs/usdt
that generates following tracing policy:
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
creationTimestamp: "2025-07-28T21:23:36Z"
name: usdts
spec:
usdts:
- message: ""
name: usdt0
path: ./contrib/tester-progs/usdt
provider: test
- args:
- index: 0
label: -4@-12(%rbp)
maxData: false
resolve: ""
returnCopy: false
sizeArgIndex: 0
type: int32
- index: 1
label: -8@-8(%rbp)
maxData: false
resolve: ""
returnCopy: false
sizeArgIndex: 0
type: int64
- index: 2
label: 8@%rax
maxData: false
resolve: ""
returnCopy: false
sizeArgIndex: 0
type: uint64
Each USDT probe is defined with binary Path plus Provider and Name tags.
The combination of Provider and Name allows to group usdt probes and
is usually specific for each application.
Each probe can have up to 5 arguments (which is a tetragon limitation) that
follow standard argument definitions used for other probes.
LSM BPF
LSM BPF programs allow runtime instrumentation of the LSM hooks by privileged
users to implement system-wide MAC (Mandatory Access Control) and Audit policies
using eBPF.
List of LSM hooks which can be instrumented can be found in security/security.c.
To verify if BPF LSM is available use the following command:
cat /boot/config-$(uname -r) | grep BPF_LSM
The output should be similar to this if BPF LSM is supported:
CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y
Then, if provided above conditions are met, use this command to check if BPF LSM is enabled:
cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
The output might look like this:
bpf,lockdown,integrity,apparmor
If the output includes the bpf, than BPF LSM is enabled. Otherwise, you can modify /etc/default/grub:
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="lsm=lockdown,integrity,apparmor,bpf"
Then, update the grub configuration and restart the system.
The provided example of LSM BPF TracingPolicy monitors access to files
/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow with /usr/bin/cat executable.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "lsm-file-open"
spec:
lsmhooks:
- hook: "file_open"
args:
- index: 0
type: "file"
selectors:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/bin/cat"
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/passwd"
- "/etc/shadow"
Arguments
Kprobes, uprobes and tracepoints all share a needed arguments fields called args. It is a list of
arguments to include in the trace output. Tetragon’s BPF code requires
information about the types of arguments to properly read, print and
filter on its arguments. This information needs to be provided by the user under the
args section. For the available
types,
check the TracingPolicy
CRD.
Following our example, here is the part that defines the arguments:
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
- index: 1
type: "file"
Each argument can optionally include a ’label’ parameter, which will be included
in the output. This can be used to annotate the arguments to help with understanding
and processing the output. As an example, here is the same definition, with an
appropriate label on the int argument:
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
label: "FD"
- index: 1
type: "file"
To properly read and hook onto the fd_install(unsigned int fd, struct file *file) function, the YAML snippet above tells the BPF code that the first
argument is an int and the second argument is a file, which is the
struct file
of the kernel. In this way, the BPF code and its printer can properly collect
and print the arguments.
These types are sorted by the index field, where you can specify the order.
The indexing starts with 0. So, index: 0 means, this is going to be the first
argument of the function, index: 1 means this is going to be the second
argument of the function, etc.
Note that for some args types, char_buf and char_iovec, there are
additional fields named returnCopy and sizeArgIndex available:
returnCopy indicates that the corresponding argument should be read later (when
the kretprobe for the symbol is triggered) because it might not be populated
when the kprobe is triggered at the entrance of the function. For example, a
buffer supplied to read(2) won’t have content until kretprobe is triggered.sizeArgIndex indicates the (1-based, see warning below) index of the arguments
that represents the size of the char_buf or iovec. For example, for
write(2), the third argument, size_t count is the number of char
element that we can read from the const void *buf pointer from the second
argument. Similarly, if we would like to capture the __x64_sys_writev(long, iovec *, vlen) syscall, then iovec has a size of vlen, which is going to
be the third argument.
Caution sizeArgIndex is inconsistent at the moment and does not take the index, but
the number of the index (or index + 1). So if the size is the third argument,
index 2, the value should be 3.
These flags can be combined, see the example below.
- call: "sys_write"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
- index: 1
type: "char_buf"
returnCopy: true
sizeArgIndex: 3
- index: 2
type: "size_t"
Note that you can specify which arguments you would like to print from a
specific syscall. For example if you don’t care about the file descriptor,
which is the first int argument with index: 0 and just want the char_buf,
what is written, then you can leave this section out and just define:
args:
- index: 1
type: "char_buf"
returnCopy: true
sizeArgIndex: 3
- index: 2
type: "size_t"
This tells the printer to skip printing the int arg because it’s not useful.
For char_buf type up to the 4096 bytes are stored. Data with bigger size are
cut and returned as truncated bytes.
You can specify maxData flag for char_buf type to read maximum possible data
(currently 327360 bytes), like:
args:
- index: 1
type: "char_buf"
maxData: true
sizeArgIndex: 3
- index: 2
type: "size_t"
This field is only used for char_buff data. When this value is false (default),
the bpf program will fetch at most 4096 bytes. In later kernels (>=5.4) tetragon
supports fetching up to 327360 bytes if this flag is turned on.
The maxData flag does not work with returnCopy flag at the moment, so it’s
usable only for syscalls/functions that do not require return probe to read the
data.
Attribute resolution
Caution- For kprobes, available only from kernel version 5.4.
- For LSM, available only from kernel version 5.7.
- For uprobes, this functionality is not supported.
This functionality allows you to dynamically extract specific attributes from
kernel structures passed as parameters to Kprobes and LSM hooks.
For example, when using the bprm_check_security LSM hook, you can access and
display attributes from the parameter struct linux_binprm *bprm at index 0.
This parameter contains many informations you may want to access.
With the resolve flag, you can easily access fields such as
mm.owner.real_parent.comm, which provides the parent process comm.
How it works
The following tracing policy demonstrates how to use the resolve flag to extract the
parent process’s comm during the execution of a binary:
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "lsm"
spec:
lsmhooks:
- hook: "bprm_check_security"
args:
- index: 0 # struct linux_binprm *bprm
type: "string"
resolve: "mm.owner.real_parent.comm"
selectors:
- matchActions:
- action: Post
index flag : The parameter at index 0 is a pointer to the
struct linux_binprm.resolve flag : Using the resolve flag, the policy extracts the
mm.owner.real_parent.comm field, representing the parent process’s comm.
Caution- This feature requires you to read the kernel structure definitions to find what you’re
looking for in the hook parameter attributes. For instance, if you want to have a look
at what is available inside
struct linux_binprm, take a look at its definition in
include/linux/binfmts.h - Some structures are dynamic. This means that they may change at runtime.
Tetragon can also handle some structures such as struct file or struct path and a few others. This means you can also extract the whole struct, if it is
available in the attributes of the parameter, and set the type with the correct type
like this :
...
lsmhooks:
- hook: "bprm_check_security"
args:
- index: 0 # struct linux_binprm *bprm
type: "file"
resolve: "file"
...
Or
...
lsmhooks:
- hook: "bprm_check_security"
args:
- index: 0
type: "path"
resolve: "file.f_path"
...
The following tracing policy demonstrates how to use the resolve flag on nested
pointers. For exemple, the hook security_inode_copy_up (defined in
security/security.c)
takes two parameters: struct dentry *src and struct cred **new. The resolve
flag allows you to access fields within these nested structures transparently.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "lsm"
spec:
kprobes:
- call: "security_inode_copy_up"
syscall: false
args:
- index: 0 # struct dentry *src
type: "int64"
- index: 1 # struct cred **new
type: "int"
resolve: "user.uid.val"
selectors:
- matchActions:
- action: Post
Data
Kprobes allow definition of data fields and following matchData selector
that allows to retrieve data from kernel current task object and specify
filter on it.
Following example defines data field that retrieves comm field from
kernel current_task object.
data:
- type: "string"
source: "current_task"
resolve: "comm"
selectors:
- matchData:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "example"
Note all data field spec definitions need to define source (ATM only available value
is current_task) and resolve string based on kernel struct task_struct object.
Return values
A TracingPolicy spec can specify that the return value should be reported in
the tracing output. To do this, the return parameter of the call needs to be
set to true, and the returnArg parameter needs to be set to specify the
type of the return argument. For example:
- call: "sk_alloc"
syscall: false
return: true
args:
- index: 1
type: int
label: "family"
returnArg:
index: 0
type: sock
In this case, the sk_alloc hook is specified to return a value of type sock
(a pointer to a struct sock). Whenever the sk_alloc hook is hit, not only
will it report the family parameter in index 1, it will also report the socket
that was created.
Return values for socket tracking
A unique feature of a sock being returned from a hook such as sk_alloc is that
the socket it refers to can be tracked. Most networking hooks in the network stack
are run in a context that is not that of the process that owns the socket for which
the actions relate; this is because networking happens asynchronously and not
entirely in-line with the process. The sk_alloc hook does, however, occur in the
context of the process, such that the task, the PID, and the TGID are of the process
that requested that the socket was created.
Specifying socket tracking tells Tetragon to store a mapping between the socket
and the process’ PID and TGID; and to use that mapping when it sees the socket in a
sock argument in another hook to replace the PID and TGID of the context with the
process that actually owns the socket. This can be done by adding a returnArgAction
to the call. Available actions are TrackSock and UntrackSock.
See TrackSock and UntrackSock.
- call: "sk_alloc"
syscall: false
return: true
args:
- index: 1
type: int
label: "family"
returnArg:
index: 0
type: sock
returnArgAction: TrackSock
Socket tracking is only available on kernels >=5.3.
Lists
It’s possible to define list of functions and use it in the kprobe’s call field.
Following example traces all sys_dup[23] syscalls.
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "sys_dup2"
- "sys_dup3"
kprobes:
- call: "list:dups"
It is basically a shortcut for following policy:
spec:
kprobes:
- call: "sys_dup"
syscall: true
- call: "sys_dup2"
syscall: true
- call: "sys_dup3"
syscall: true
As shown in subsequent examples, its main benefit is allowing a single definition for
calls that have the same filters.
The list is defined under lists field with arbitrary values for name and values fields.
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "sys_dup2"
- "sys_dup3"
...
It’s possible to define multiple lists.
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "sys_dup2"
- "sys_dup3"
name: "another"
- "sys_open"
- "sys_close"
Syscalls specified with sys_ prefix are translated to their 64 bit equivalent function names.
It’s possible to specify a syscall for an alternative ABI by using the ABI name as a prefix.
For example:
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "i386/sys_dup"
name: "another"
- "sys_open"
- "sys_close"
Specific list can be referenced in kprobe’s call field with "list:NAME" value.
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
...
kprobes:
- call: "list:dups"
The kprobe definition creates a kprobe for each item in the list and shares the rest
of the config specified for kprobe.
List can also specify type field that implies extra checks on the values (like for syscall type)
or denote that the list is generated automatically (see below).
User must specify syscall type for list with syscall functions. Also syscall functions
can’t be mixed with regular functions in the list.
The additional selector configuration is shared with all functions in the list.
In following example we create 3 kprobes that share the same pid filter.
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "sys_dup2"
- "sys_dup3"
kprobes:
- call: "list:dups"
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: In
followForks: true
isNamespacePID: false
values:
- 12345
It’s possible to use argument filter together with the list.
It’s important to understand that the argument will be retrieved by using the specified
argument type for all the functions in the list.
Following example adds argument filter for first argument on all functions in dups list to
match value 9999.
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "sys_dup2"
- "sys_dup3"
kprobes:
- call: "list:dups"
args:
- index: 0
type: int
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- 9999
There are two additional special types of generated lists.
The generated_syscalls type of list that generates list with all possible
syscalls on the system.
Following example traces all syscalls for /usr/bin/kill binary.
spec:
lists:
- name: "all-syscalls"
type: "generated_syscalls"
kprobes:
- call: "list:all-syscalls"
selectors:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/bin/kill"
The generated_ftrace type of list that generates functions from ftrace available_filter_functions
file with specified filter. The filter is specified with pattern field and expects regular expression.
Following example traces all kernel ksys_* functions for /usr/bin/kill binary.
spec:
lists:
- name: "ksys"
type: "generated_ftrace"
pattern: "^ksys_*"
kprobes:
- call: "list:ksys"
selectors:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/bin/kill"
Note that if syscall list is used in selector with InMap operator, the argument type needs to be syscall64, like.
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "i386/sys_dup"
tracepoints:
- subsystem: "raw_syscalls"
event: "sys_enter"
args:
- index: 4
type: "syscall64"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "InMap"
values:
- "list:dups"
5 - Selectors
Perform in-kernel BPF filtering and actions on events
Selectors enable per-hook in-kernel BPF filtering and actions. Each selector defines a set of
filters as well as a set of (optional) actions to be performed if the selector filters match. Each
hook can contain up to 5 selectors. If no selectors are defined on a hook, the default action
(Post, i.e., post an event) will be used.
Each selector comprises a set of filters:
And a set of actions that will be performed if the specified filters match:
For a selector to match, all of its filters must match (AND operator). If a selector defines no
filters, it matches. If multiple selectors are defined in a hook, only the action defined in the
first matching selector will be applied (short-circuited OR). If a selector defines no action, the
default action (Post) is applied.
For example, the following policy will generate events when the sys_mount system call is executed
by binaries other than /usr/bin/mount.
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "mount-example"
spec:
kprobes:
- call: "sys_mount"
syscall: true
selectors:
# first selector
- matchBinaries:
- operator: In
values:
- "/usr/bin/mount"
matchActions:
- action: NoPost
# second selector
- matchActions:
- action: Post
Arguments filter
Arguments filters can be specified under the matchArgs field and provide
filtering based on the value of the function’s argument.
You can specify the argument either in the index or in args field. The index field
denotes the argument position within the function arguments, while the args
field denotes the arguments position within the spec arguments. Both fields are
zero based (1st argument has zero value). The args field (if defined) takes
precedence over index field.
The args field can support multiple arguments. Currently, the only operator that supports more
than 1 argument is the CapabilitiesGained operator.
In the next example, a selector is defined with a matchArgs filter that tells
the BPF code to process only the function call for which the second argument,
index equal to 1, concerns the file under the path /etc/passwd or
/etc/shadow. It’s using the operator Equal to match against the value of
the argument.
Note that conveniently, we can match against a path directly when the argument
is of type file.
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/passwd"
- "/etc/shadow"
In the next example, a selector is defined with a matchArgs filter that tells
the BPF code to process only the function call for which the second spec argument,
args equals to [1] (which represents 1st function argument, index equals to 0),
has value 0xcoffee.
- args:
- index: 2
type: "int"
label: "arg0-index2"
- index: 0
type: "int"
label: "arg1-index1"
- index: 1
type: "int"
label: "arg2-index0"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- args: [1]
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "0xcoffee"
Note that you can mix index and arg fields within matchArgs selector definitions.
The available operators for matchArgs are:
EqualNotEqualPrefixPostfixMask
Further examples
In the previous example, we used the operator Equal, but we can also use the
Prefix operator and match against all files under /etc with:
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Prefix"
values:
- "/etc"
In this situation, an event will be created every time a process tries to
access a file under /etc.
Although it makes less sense, you can also match over the first argument, to
only detect events that will use the file descriptor 4, which is usually the
first that come afters stdin, stdout and stderr in process. And combine that
with the previous example.
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "3"
- index: 1
operator: "Prefix"
values:
- "/etc"
Data filter
Data filters can be specified under the matchData field and provide
filtering based on the value of the specified data field.
You can specify the argument either in the index or in args field. Both index and
args field denote the argument position within the spec file.
In the following example we extra pid value from current_task and filter
on all values except for 1.
data:
- type: "string"
source: "current_task"
resolve: "pid"
selectors:
- matchData:
- index: 0
operator: "NotEqual"
values:
- "1"
Return args filter
Arguments filters can be specified under the returnMatchArgs field and
provide filtering based on the value of the function return value. It allows
you to filter on the return value, thus success, error or value returned by a
kernel call.
matchReturnArgs:
- operator: "NotEqual"
values:
- 0
The available operators for matchReturnArgs are:
EqualNotEqualPrefixPostfix
A use case for this would be to detect the failed access to certain files, like
/etc/shadow. Doing cat /etc/shadow will use a openat syscall that will
returns -1 for a failed attempt with an unprivileged user.
PIDs filter
PIDs filters can be specified under the matchPIDs field and provide filtering
based on the value of host pid of the process. For example, the following
matchPIDs filter tells the BPF code that observe only hooks for which the
host PID is equal to either pid1 or pid2 or pid3:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: "In"
followForks: true
values:
- "pid1"
- "pid2"
- "pid3"
The available operators for matchPIDs are:
Further examples
Another example can be to collect all processes not associated with a
container’s init PID, which is equal to 1. In this way, we are able to detect
if there was a kubectl exec performed inside a container because processes
created by kubectl exec are not children of PID 1.
- matchPIDs:
- operator: NotIn
followForks: false
isNamespacePID: true
values:
- 1
Binaries filter
Binary filters can be specified under the matchBinaries field and provide
filtering based on the value of a certain binary name. For example, the
following matchBinaries selector tells the BPF code to process only system
calls and kernel functions that are coming from cat or tail.
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/bin/cat"
- "/usr/bin/tail"
The available operators for matchBinaries are:
InNotInPrefixNotPrefixPostfixNotPostfix
The values field has to be a map of strings. The default behaviour
is followForks: true, so all the child processes are followed.
Follow children
the matchBinaries filter can be configured to also apply to children of matching processes. To do
this, set followChildren to true. For example:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/sbin/sshd"
followChildren: true
There are a number of limitations when using followChildren:
- Children created before the policy was installed will not be matched
- The number of
matchBinaries sections with followChildren: true cannot exceed 64. - Operators other than
In are not supported.
Further examples
One example can be to monitor all the sys_write system calls which are
coming from the /usr/sbin/sshd binary and its child processes and writing to
stdin/stdout/stderr.
This is how we can monitor what was written to the console by different users
during different ssh sessions. The matchBinaries selector in this case is the
following:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/sbin/sshd"
followChildren: true
while the whole kprobe call is the following:
- call: "sys_write"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
- index: 1
type: "char_buf"
sizeArgIndex: 3
- index: 2
type: "size_t"
selectors:
# match to /sbin/sshd
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/sbin/sshd"
followChildren: true
# match to stdin/stdout/stderr
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "1"
- "2"
- "3"
Namespaces filter
Namespaces filters can be specified under the matchNamespaces field and
provide filtering of calls based on Linux namespace. You can specify the
namespace inode or use the special host_ns keyword, see the example and
description for more information.
An example syntax is:
- matchNamespaces:
- namespace: Pid
operator: In
values:
- "4026531836"
- "4026531835"
This will match if: [Pid namespace is 4026531836] OR [Pid namespace is
4026531835]
namespace can be: Uts, Ipc, Mnt, Pid, PidForChildren, Net,
Cgroup, or User. Time and TimeForChildren are also available in Linux
>= 5.6.operator can be In or NotInvalues can be raw numeric values (i.e. obtained from lsns) or "host_ns"
which will automatically be translated to the appropriate value.
Limitations
- We can have up to 4
values. These can be both numeric and host_ns inside
a single namespace. - We can have up to 4
namespace values under matchNamespaces in Linux
kernel < 5.3. In Linux >= 5.3 we can have up to 10 values (i.e. the maximum
number of namespaces that modern kernels provide).
Further examples
We can have multiple namespace filters:
selectors:
- matchNamespaces:
- namespace: Pid
operator: In
values:
- "4026531836"
- "4026531835"
- namespace: Mnt
operator: In
values:
- "4026531833"
- "4026531834"
This will match if: ([Pid namespace is 4026531836] OR [Pid namespace is
4026531835]) AND ([Mnt namespace is 4026531833] OR [Mnt namespace
is 4026531834])
Use cases examples
Generate a kprobe event if /etc/shadow was opened by /bin/cat which
either had host Net or Mnt namespace access
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "example_ns_1"
spec:
kprobes:
- call: "fd_install"
syscall: false
args:
- index: 0
type: int
- index: 1
type: "file"
selectors:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/bin/cat"
matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/shadow"
matchNamespaces:
- namespace: Mnt
operator: In
values:
- "host_ns"
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/bin/cat"
matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/shadow"
matchNamespaces:
- namespace: Net
operator: In
values:
- "host_ns"
This example has 2 selectors. Note that each selector starts with -.
Selector 1:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/bin/cat"
matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/shadow"
matchNamespaces:
- namespace: Mnt
operator: In
values:
- "host_ns"
Selector 2:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/bin/cat"
matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/shadow"
matchNamespaces:
- namespace: Net
operator: In
values:
- "host_ns"
We have [Selector1 OR Selector2]. Inside each selector we have filters.
Both selectors have 3 filters (i.e. matchBinaries, matchArgs, and
matchNamespaces) with different arguments. Adding a - in the beginning of a
filter will result in a new selector.
So the previous CRD will match if:
[binary == /bin/cat AND arg1 == /etc/shadow AND MntNs == host] OR
[binary == /bin/cat AND arg1 == /etc/shadow AND NetNs is host]
We can modify the previous example as follows:
Generate a kprobe event if /etc/shadow was opened by /bin/cat which has
host Net and Mnt namespace access
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "example_ns_2"
spec:
kprobes:
- call: "fd_install"
syscall: false
args:
- index: 0
type: int
- index: 1
type: "file"
selectors:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/bin/cat"
matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/shadow"
matchNamespaces:
- namespace: Mnt
operator: In
values:
- "host_ns"
- namespace: Net
operator: In
values:
- "host_ns"
Here we have a single selector. This CRD will match if:
[binary == /bin/cat AND arg1 == /etc/shadow AND (MntNs == host AND
NetNs == host) ]
Capabilities filter
Capabilities filters can be specified under the matchCapabilities field and
provide filtering of calls based on Linux capabilities in the specific sets.
An example syntax is:
- matchCapabilities:
- type: Effective
operator: In
values:
- "CAP_CHOWN"
- "CAP_NET_RAW"
This will match if: [Effective capabilities contain CAP_CHOWN] OR
[Effective capabilities contain CAP_NET_RAW]
type can be: Effective, Inheritable, or Permitted.operator can be In or NotInvalues can be any supported capability. A list of all supported
capabilities can be found in /usr/include/linux/capability.h.
Limitations
- There is no limit in the number of capabilities listed under
values. - Only one
type field can be specified under matchCapabilities.
Namespace changes filter
Namespace changes filter can be specified under the matchNamespaceChanges
field and provide filtering based on calls that are changing Linux namespaces.
This filter can be useful to track execution of code in a new namespace or even
container escapes that change their namespaces.
For instance, if an unprivileged process creates a new user namespace, it gains
full privileges within that namespace. This grants the process the ability to
perform some privileged operations within the context of this new namespace
that would otherwise only be available to privileged root user. As a result, such
filter is useful to track namespace creation, which can be abused by untrusted
processes.
To keep track of the changes, when a process_exec happens, the namespaces of
the process are recorded and these are compared with the current namespaces on
the event with a matchNamespaceChanges filter.
matchNamespaceChanges:
- operator: In
values:
- "Mnt"
The unshare command, or executing in the host namespace using nsenter can
be used to test this feature.
Capability changes filter
Capability changes filter can be specified under the matchCapabilityChanges
field and provide filtering based on calls that are changing Linux capabilities.
To keep track of the changes, when a process_exec happens, the capabilities
of the process are recorded and these are compared with the current
capabilities on the event with a matchCapabilityChanges filter.
matchCapabilityChanges:
- type: Effective
operator: In
isNamespaceCapability: false
values:
- "CAP_SETUID"
See a demonstration example
of this feature.
Actions filter
Actions filters are a list of actions that execute when an appropriate selector
matches. They are defined under matchActions and currently, the following
action types are supported:
Warning The FollowFD and related (UnfollowFD, CopyFD) actions have been deprecated due to being unsafe and
are planned to be removed in version 1.5.
Note Sigkill, Override, FollowFD, UnfollowFD, CopyFD, Post,
TrackSock and UntrackSock are
executed directly in the kernel BPF code while GetUrl and DnsLookup are
happening in userspace after the reception of events.
Sigkill action
Sigkill action terminates synchronously the process that made the call that
matches the appropriate selectors from the kernel. In the example below, every
sys_write system call with a PID not equal to 1 or 0 attempting to write to
/etc/passwd will be terminated. Indeed when using kubectl exec, a new
process is spawned in the container PID namespace and is not a child of PID 1.
- call: "sys_write"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "fd"
- index: 1
type: "char_buf"
sizeArgIndex: 3
- index: 2
type: "size_t"
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: NotIn
followForks: true
isNamespacePID: true
values:
- 0
- 1
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Prefix"
values:
- "/etc/passwd"
matchActions:
- action: Sigkill
Caution Please consult the
Enforcement section if you plan to use
this action for enforcement.
Signal action
Signal action sends specified signal to current process. The signal number
is specified with argSig value.
Following example is equivalent to the Sigkill action example above.
The difference is to use the signal action with SIGKILL(9) signal.
- call: "sys_write"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "fd"
- index: 1
type: "char_buf"
sizeArgIndex: 3
- index: 2
type: "size_t"
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: NotIn
followForks: true
isNamespacePID: true
values:
- 0
- 1
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Prefix"
values:
- "/etc/passwd"
matchActions:
- action: Signal
argSig: 9
Caution Please consult the
Enforcement section if you plan to use
this action for enforcement.
Override action
Override action is defined for kprobe and uprobe selectors.
Override action for kprobe
Override action allows to modify the return value of call. While Sigkill
will terminate the entire process responsible for making the call, Override
will run in place of the original kprobed function and return the value
specified in the argError field. It’s then up to the code path or the user
space process handling the returned value to whether stop or proceed with the
execution.
For example, you can create a TracingPolicy that intercepts sys_symlinkat
and will make it return -1 every time the first argument is equal to the
string /etc/passwd:
kprobes:
- call: "sys_symlinkat"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "string"
- index: 1
type: "int"
- index: 2
type: "string"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/passwd\0"
matchActions:
- action: Override
argError: -1
NoteOverride uses the kernel error injection framework and is only available
on kernels compiled with CONFIG_BPF_KPROBE_OVERRIDE configuration option.
Overriding system calls is the primary use case, but there are other kernel
functions that support error injections too. These functions are annotated
with ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() in the kernel source, and can be identified by
reading the file /sys/kernel/debug/error_injection/list.
Starting from kernel version 5.7 overriding security_ hooks is also possible.
Caution For kernel developers: if you want to override your kernel functions then
ensure they properly follow the
Error Injectable Functions guide.
Override action for uprobe
Warning Beware, here be dragons!!! Use with caution, it could easily crash traced application.
Note that Override action can be used only on x86_64 architecture.
Similar to kprobe, the uprobe Override action allows to modify the return value
of user space call with argError argument, like:
uprobes:
- path: "test"
symbols:
- "func"
selectors:
- matchActions:
- action: Override
argError: 123
Note that it can be successfully used only when following conditions are met:
- uprobe is attached to the beggining of the user space function;
- user space function is called via
call instruction; - user space function returns
int type.
It’s possible to override specific registers with arbitrary value with argRegs
argument, like:
uprobes:
- path: "test"
symbols:
- "func"
selectors:
- matchActions:
- action: Override
argRegs:
- "rax=11"
- "rbp=(%rsp)"
- "rip=8(%rsp)"
- "rsp=8%rsp"
The argRegs argument is an array of strings where each string start with destination
register name followed by = and an assignment expression, which can be one of the
following types:
- constant
rax=11 - register
rbp=(%rsp) - register plus offset
rip=8(%rsp) - dereference of register plus offset
rsp=8%rsp
Note This interface is likely to be changed in the future.
FollowFD action
Warning The FollowFD and related (UnfollowFD, CopyFD) actions have been deprecated due to being unsafe and
are planned to be removed in version 1.5.
The FollowFD action allows to create a mapping using a BPF map between file
descriptors and filenames. After its creation, the mapping can be maintained
through UnfollowFD and CopyFD
actions. Note that proper maintenance of the mapping is up to the tracing policy
writer.
FollowFD is typically used at hook points where a file descriptor and its
associated filename appear together. The kernel function fd_install
is a good example.
The fd_install kernel function is called each time a file descriptor must be
installed into the file descriptor table of a process, typically referenced
within system calls like open or openat. It is a good place for tracking
file descriptor and filename matching.
Let’s take a look at the following example:
- call: "fd_install"
syscall: false
args:
- index: 0
type: int
- index: 1
type: "file"
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
# [...]
matchArgs:
# [...]
matchActions:
- action: FollowFD
argFd: 0
argName: 1
This action uses the dedicated argFd and argName fields to get respectively
the index of the file descriptor argument and the index of the name argument in
the call.
While the mapping between the file descriptor and filename remains in place
(that is, between FollowFD and UnfollowFD for the same file descriptor)
tracing policies may refer to filenames instead of file descriptors. This
offers greater convenience and allows more functionality to reside inside the
kernel, thereby reducing overhead.
For instance, assume that you want to prevent writes into file
/etc/passwd. The system call sys_write only receives a file descriptor,
not a filename, as argument. Yet with a bracketing pair of FollowFD
and UnfollowFD actions in place the tracing policy that hooks into sys_write
can nevertheless refer to the filename /etc/passwd,
if it also marks the relevant argument as of type fd.
The following example combines actions FollowFD and UnfollowFD as well
as an argument of type fd to such effect:
kprobes:
- call: "fd_install"
syscall: false
args:
- index: 0
type: int
- index: 1
type: "file"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/tmp/passwd"
matchActions:
- action: FollowFD
argFd: 0
argName: 1
- call: "sys_write"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "fd"
- index: 1
type: "char_buf"
sizeArgIndex: 3
- index: 2
type: "size_t"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/tmp/passwd"
matchActions:
- action: Sigkill
- call: "sys_close"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
selectors:
- matchActions:
- action: UnfollowFD
argFd: 0
argName: 0
UnfollowFD action
Warning The FollowFD and related (UnfollowFD, CopyFD) actions have been deprecated due to being unsafe and
are planned to be removed in version 1.5.
The UnfollowFD action takes a file descriptor from a system call and deletes
the corresponding entry from the BPF map, where it was put under the FollowFD
action.
It is typically used at hooks points where the scope of association between
a file descriptor and a filename ends. The system call sys_close is a
good example.
Let’s take a look at the following example:
- call: "sys_close"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: NotIn
followForks: true
isNamespacePID: true
values:
- 0
- 1
matchActions:
- action: UnfollowFD
argFd: 0
Similar to the FollowFD action, the index of the file descriptor is described
under argFd:
matchActions:
- action: UnfollowFD
argFd: 0
In this example, argFD is 0. So, the argument from the sys_close system
call at index: 0 will be deleted from the BPF map whenever a sys_close is
executed.
Caution Whenever we would like to follow a file descriptor with a FollowFD block,
there should be a matching UnfollowFD block, otherwise the BPF map will be
broken.
CopyFD action
Warning The FollowFD and related (UnfollowFD, CopyFD) actions have been deprecated due to being unsafe and
are planned to be removed in version 1.5.
The CopyFD action is specific to duplication of file descriptor use cases.
Similary to FollowFD, it takes an argFd and argName arguments. It can
typically be used tracking the dup, dup2 or dup3 syscalls.
See the following example for illustration:
- call: "sys_dup2"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "fd"
- index: 1
type: "int"
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
# [...]
matchActions:
- action: CopyFD
argFd: 0
argName: 1
- call: "sys_dup3"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "fd"
- index: 1
type: "int"
- index: 2
type: "int"
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
# [...]
matchActions:
- action: CopyFD
argFd: 0
argName: 1
GetUrl action
The GetUrl action can be used to perform a remote interaction such as
triggering Thinkst canaries or any system that can be triggered via an URL
request. It uses the argUrl field to specify the URL to request using GET
method.
matchActions:
- action: GetUrl
argUrl: http://ebpf.io
DnsLookup action
The DnsLookup action can be used to perform a remote interaction such as
triggering Thinkst canaries or any system that can be triggered via an DNS
entry request. It uses the argFqdn field to specify the domain to lookup.
matchActions:
- action: DnsLookup
argFqdn: ebpf.io
Post action
The Post action allows an event to be transmitted to the agent, from
kernelspace to userspace. By default, all TracingPolicy hook will create an
event with the Post action except in those situations:
- a
NoPost action was specified in a matchActions; - a rate-limiting parameter is in place, see details below.
This action allows you to specify parameters for the Post action.
Rate limiting
Post takes the rateLimit parameter with a time value. This value defaults
to seconds, but post-fixing ’m’ or ‘h’ will cause the value to be interpreted
in minutes or hours. When this parameter is specified for an action, that
action will check if the same action has fired, for the same thread, within
the time window, with the same inspected arguments. (Only the first 40 bytes
of each inspected argument is used in the matching. Only supported on kernels
v5.3 onwards.)
For example, you can specify a selector to only generate an event every 5
minutes with adding the following action and its paramater:
matchActions:
- action: Post
rateLimit: 5m
By default, the rate limiting is applied per thread, meaning that only repeated
actions by the same thread will be rate limited. This can be expanded to all
threads for a process by specifying a rateLimitScope with value “process”; or
can be expanded to all processes by specifying the same with the value “global”.
Stack traces
Post takes the kernelStackTrace parameter, when turned to true (by default to
false) it enables dump of the kernel stack trace to the hook point in kprobes
events. To dump user space stack trace set userStackTrace parameter to true.
For example, the following kprobe hook can be used to retrieve the
kernel stack to kfree_skb_reason, the function called in the kernel to drop
kernel socket buffers.
kprobes:
- call: kfree_skb_reason
selectors:
- matchActions:
- action: Post
kernelStackTrace: true
userStackTrace: true
CautionBy default Tetragon does not expose the linear addresses from kernel space or
user space, you need to enable the flag --expose-stack-addresses to get the
addresses along the rest.
Note that the Tetragon agent is using its privilege to read the kernel symbols
and their address. Being able to retrieve kernel symbols address can be used to
break kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR) so only privileged users
should be able to enable this feature and read events containing stack traces.
The same thing we can say about retrieving address for user mode processes.
Stack trace addresses can be used to bypass address space layout randomization (ASLR).
Once loaded, events created from this policy will contain a new kernel_stack_trace
field on the process_kprobe event with an output similar to:
{
"address": "18446744072119856613",
"offset": "5",
"symbol": "kfree_skb_reason"
},
{
"address": "18446744072119769755",
"offset": "107",
"symbol": "__sys_connect_file"
},
{
"address": "18446744072119769989",
"offset": "181",
"symbol": "__sys_connect"
},
[...]
The “address” is the kernel function address, “offset” is the offset into the
native instruction for the function and “symbol” is the function symbol name.
User mode stack trace is contained in user_stack_trace field on the
process_kprobe event and looks like:
{
"address": "140498967885099",
"offset": "1209643",
"symbol": "__connect",
"module": "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6"
},
{
"address": "140498968021470",
"offset": "1346014",
"symbol": "inet_pton",
"module": "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6"
},
{
"address": "140498971185511",
"offset": "106855",
"module": "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl.so.4.7.0"
},
The “address” is the function address, “offset” is the function offset from the
beginning of the binary module. “module” is the absolute path of the binary file
to which address belongs. “symbol” is the function symbol name. “symbol” may be missing
if the binary file is stripped.
NoteInformation from procfs (/proc/<pid>/maps) is used to symbolize user
stack trace addresses. Stack trace addresses extraction and symbolizing are async.
It might happen that process is terminated and the /proc/<pid>/maps file will be
not existed at user stack trace symbolization step. In such case user stack traces
for very short living process might be not collected.
For Linux kernels before 5.15 user stack traces may be incomplete (some stack
traces entries may be missed).
This output can be enhanced in a more human friendly using the tetra getevents -o compact command. Indeed, by default, it will print the stack trace along
the compact output of the event similarly to this:
❓ syscall /usr/bin/curl kfree_skb_reason
Kernel:
0xffffffffa13f2de5: kfree_skb_reason+0x5
0xffffffffa13dda9b: __sys_connect_file+0x6b
0xffffffffa13ddb85: __sys_connect+0xb5
0xffffffffa13ddbd8: __x64_sys_connect+0x18
0xffffffffa1714bd8: do_syscall_64+0x58
0xffffffffa18000e6: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e
User space:
0x7f878cf2752b: __connect (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x12752b)
0x7f878cf489de: inet_pton (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x1489de)
0x7f878d1b6167: (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl.so.4.7.0+0x1a167)
The printing format for kernel stack trace is "0x%x: %s+0x%x", address, symbol, offset.
The printing format for user stack trace is "0x%x: %s (%s+0x%x)", address, symbol, module, offset.
Note Compact output will display missing addresses as 0x0, see the above note on
--expose-stack-addresses for more info.
File hash collection with IMA
Post takes the imaHash parameter, when turned to true (by default to
false) it adds file hashes in LSM events calculated by Linux integrity subsystem.
The following list of LSM hooks is supported:
- bprm_check_security
- bprm_committed_creds
- bprm_committing_creds
- bprm_creds_from_file
- file_ioctl
- file_lock
- file_open
- file_post_open
- file_receive
- mmap_file
First, you need to be sure that LSM BPF is enabled.
To verify if IMA-measurement is available use the following command:
cat /boot/config-$(uname -r) | grep "CONFIG_IMA\|CONFIG_INTEGRITY"
The output should be similar to this if IMA-measurement is supported:
CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
CONFIG_IMA=y
If provided above conditions are met, you can enable IMA-measurement by modifying /etc/deault/grub:
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="lsm=integrity,bpf ima_policy=tcb"
Then, update the grub configuration and restart the system.
ima_policy= is used to define which files will be measured. tcb measures all executables run,
all mmap’d files for execution (such as shared libraries), all kernel modules loaded,
and all firmware loaded. Additionally, a files opened for read by root are measured as well.
ima_policy= can be specified multiple times, and the result is the union of the policies.
To know more about ima_policy you can follow this link.
Note Hash calculation with IMA subsystem and LSM BPF is supported from 5.11 kernel version.
For kernel versions below 6.1 is recommended to mount filesystems with iversion. Mounting with iversion
helps IMA not recalculating hash if file is not changed. From kernel 6.1 iversion is by default.
It is not necessary to enable IMA to calculate hashes with Tetragon if you have kernel 6.1+.
But hashes will be recalculated no matter if file is not changed. See implementation details of
bpf_ima_file_hash helper.
The provided example of TracingPolicy collects hashes of executed binaries from
zsh and bash interpreters:
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
spec:
lsmhooks:
- hook: "bprm_check_security"
args:
- index: 0
type: "linux_binprm"
selectors:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/bin/zsh"
- "/usr/bin/bash"
matchActions:
- action: Post
imaHash: true
LSM event with file hash can look like this:
{
"process_lsm": {
"process": {
...
},
"parent": {
...
},
"function_name": "bprm_check_security",
"policy_name": "file-integrity-monitoring",
"args": [
{
"linux_binprm_arg": {
"path": "/usr/bin/grep",
"permission": "-rwxr-xr-x"
}
}
],
"action": "KPROBE_ACTION_POST",
"ima_hash": "sha256:73abb4280520053564fd4917286909ba3b054598b32c9cdfaf1d733e0202cc96"
},
}
ima_hash field contains information about hashing algorithm and the hash value itself
separated by ‘:’.
This output can be enhanced in a more human friendly using the
tetra getevents -e PROCESS_LSM -o compact command.
🔒 LSM user-nix /usr/bin/zsh bprm_check_security
/usr/bin/cat sha256:dd5526c5872cce104a80f4d4e7f787c56ab7686a5b8dedda0ba4e8b36a3c084c
🔒 LSM user-nix /usr/bin/zsh bprm_check_security
/usr/bin/grep sha256:73abb4280520053564fd4917286909ba3b054598b32c9cdfaf1d733e0202cc96
NoPost action
The NoPost action can be used to suppress the event to be generated, but at
the same time all its defined actions are performed.
It’s useful when you are not interested in the event itself, just in the action
being performed.
Following example override openat syscall for “/etc/passwd” file but does not
generate any event about that.
- call: "sys_openat"
return: true
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: int
- index: 1
type: "string"
- index: 2
type: "int"
returnArg:
index: 0
type: "int"
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
matchArgs:
- index: 1
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/passwd"
matchActions:
- action: Override
argError: -2
- action: NoPost
TrackSock action
The TrackSock action allows to create a mapping using a BPF map between sockets
and processes. It however needs to maintain a state
correctly, see UntrackSock related action. TrackSock
works similarly to FollowFD, specifying the argument with the sock type using
argSock instead of specifying the FD argument with argFd.
It is however more likely that socket tracking will be performed on the return
value of sk_alloc as described above.
Socket tracking is only available on kernel >=5.3.
UntrackSock action
The UntrackSock action takes a struct sock pointer from a function call and deletes
the corresponding entry from the BPF map, where it was put under the TrackSock
action.
Let’s take a look at the following example:
- call: "__sk_free"
syscall: false
args:
- index: 0
type: sock
selectors:
- matchActions:
- action: UntrackSock
argSock: 0
Similar to the TrackSock action, the index of the sock is described under argSock:
- matchActions:
- action: UntrackSock
argSock: 0
In this example, argSock is 0. So, the argument from the __sk_free function
call at index: 0 will be deleted from the BPF map whenever a __sk_free is
executed.
Caution Whenever we would like to track a socket with a TrackSock block,
there should be a matching UntrackSock block, otherwise the BPF map will be
broken.
Socket tracking is only available on kernel >=5.3.
Notify Enforcer action
The NotifyEnforcer action notifies the enforcer program to kill or override a syscall.
It’s meant to be used on systems with kernel that lacks multi kprobe feature, that
allows to attach many kprobes quickly). To workaround that the enforcer sensor uses
the raw syscall tracepoint and attaches simple program to syscalls that we need to
kill or override.
The specs needs to have enforcer program definition, that instructs tetragon to load
the enforcer program and attach it to specified syscalls.
spec:
enforcers:
- calls:
- "list:dups"
The syscalls expects list of syscalls or list:XXX pointer to list.
Note that currently only single enforcer definition is allowed.
The NotifyEnforcer action takes 2 arguments.
matchActions:
- action: "NotifyEnforcer"
argError: -1
argSig: 9
If specified the argError will be passed to bpf_override_return helper to override the syscall return value.
If specified the argSig will be passed to bpf_send_signal helper to override the syscall return value.
The following is spec for killing /usr/bin/bash program whenever it calls sys_dup or sys_dup2 syscalls.
spec:
lists:
- name: "dups"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "sys_dup2"
enforcers:
- calls:
- "list:dups"
tracepoints:
- subsystem: "raw_syscalls"
event: "sys_enter"
args:
- index: 4
type: "syscall64"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "InMap"
values:
- "list:dups"
matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/bin/bash"
matchActions:
- action: "NotifyEnforcer"
argSig: 9
Note as mentioned above the NotifyEnforcer with enforcer program is meant to be used only on kernel versions
with no support for fast attach of multiple kprobes (kprobe_multi link).
With kprobe_multi link support the above example can be easily replaced with:
spec:
lists:
- name: "syscalls"
type: "syscalls"
values:
- "sys_dup"
- "sys_dup2"
kprobes:
- call: "list:syscalls"
selectors:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "/usr/bin/bash"
matchActions:
- action: "Sigkill"
USDT Set action
The Set action is specific for USDT probes and allows tetragon to write
value to configured USDT probe argument. This argument needs to meet few
conditions:
- It’s stored in memory as
USDT deref argument - It has size of 4 bytes
Following command displays binary’s ELF notes which includes all defined USDT probes.
$ readelf -n ./usdt-override
...
Displaying notes found in: .note.stapsdt
Owner Data size Description
stapsdt 0x0000003e NT_STAPSDT (SystemTap probe descriptors)
Provider: tetragon
Name: test
Location: 0x0000000000001135, Base: 0x0000000000002004, Semaphore: 0x0000000000000000
Arguments: -4@-4(%rsp) -4@$1 -4@$2
- Please check
-4@-4(%rsp) for first argument load, which is USDT deref. - The
-4 in -4@-4(%rsp) stands for signed 4 bytes type.
Following C example is source for usdt-override from above. It defines USDT
probe with 3 arguments and first one meets the criteria for USDT return.
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
volatile int ret = 0;
int arg_1, arg_2;
...
USDT(tetragon, test, ret, arg_1, arg_2);
if (ret)
return -1;
...
Note the volatile used for ret variable that ensures it will be used
via memory dereferencing in USDT probe.
We can then use following tetragon policy to trace this USDT probe and
force value 1 for output argument in case the Set action is executed.
spec:
usdts:
- path: ".../usdt-override"
provider: "tetragon"
name: "test"
args:
- index: 0
type: "int32"
- index: 1
type: "int32"
- index: 2
type: "int32"
selectors:
- matchActions:
- action: Set
argIndex: 0
argValue: 1
The Set action uses following arguments:
- The
argIndex defines position of the return argument. - The
argValue defined the actual value to write.
Selector Semantics
The selector semantics of the CiliumTracingPolicy follows the standard
Kubernetes semantics and the principles that are used by Cilium to create a
unified policy definition.
To explain deeper the structure and the logic behind it, let’s consider first
the following example:
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: In
followForks: true
values:
- pid1
- pid2
- pid3
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- fdString1
In the YAML above matchPIDs and matchArgs are logically AND together
giving the expression:
(pid in {pid1, pid2, pid3} AND arg0=fdstring1)
Multiple values
When multiple values are given, we apply the OR operation between them. In
case of having multiple values under the matchPIDs selector, if any value
matches with the given pid from pid1, pid2 or pid3 then we accept the
event:
pid==pid1 OR pid==pid2 OR pid==pid3
As an example, we can filter for sys_read() syscalls that were not part of
the container initialization and the main pod process and tried to read from
the /etc/passwd file by using:
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: NotIn
followForks: true
values:
- 0
- 1
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/passwd"
Similarly, we can use multiple values under the matchArgs selector:
(pid in {pid1, pid2, pid3} AND arg0={fdstring1, fdstring2})
If any value matches with fdstring1 or fdstring2, specifically
(string==fdstring1 OR string==fdstring2) then we accept the event.
For example, we can monitor sys_read() syscalls accessing both the
/etc/passwd or the /etc/shadow files:
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: NotIn
followForks: true
values:
- 0
- 1
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/passwd"
- "/etc/shadow"
Multiple operators
When multiple operators are supported under matchPIDs or matchArgs, they
are logically AND together. In case if we have multiple operators under
matchPIDs:
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: In
followForks: true
values:
- pid1
- operator: NotIn
followForks: true
values:
- pid2
then we would build the following expression on the BPF side:
(pid == 0[following forks]) && (pid != 1[following forks])
In case of having multiple matchArgs:
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: In
followForks: true
values:
- pid1
- pid2
- pid3
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- 1
- index: 2
operator: "lt"
values:
- 500
Then we would build the following expression on the BPF side
(pid in {pid1, pid2, pid3} AND arg0=1 AND arg2 < 500)
Operator types
There are different types supported for each operator. In case of matchArgs:
- Equal
- NotEqual
- Prefix
- Postfix
- Mask
- GreaterThan (aka GT)
- LessThan (aka LT)
- SPort - Source Port
- NotSPort - Not Source Port
- SPortPriv - Source Port is Privileged (0-1023)
- NotSPortPriv - Source Port is Not Privileged (Not 0-1023)
- DPort - Destination Port
- NotDPort - Not Destination Port
- DPortPriv - Destination Port is Privileged (0-1023)
- NotDPortPriv - Destination Port is Not Privileged (Not 0-1023)
- SAddr - Source Address, can be IPv4/6 address or IPv4/6 CIDR (for ex 1.2.3.4/24 or 2a1:56::1/128)
- NotSAddr - Not Source Address
- DAddr - Destination Address
- NotDAddr - Not Destination Address
- Protocol
- Family
- State
- InRange - In interval range
- NotInRange - Not in interval range
The operator types Equal and NotEqual are used to test whether the certain
argument of a system call is equal to the defined value in the CR.
For example, the following YAML snippet matches if the argument at index 0 is
equal to /etc/passwd:
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "/etc/passwd"
Both Equal and NotEqual are set operations. This means if multiple values
are specified, they are ORd together in case of Equal, and ANDd together
in case of NotEqual.
For example, in case of Equal the following YAML snippet matches if the
argument at index 0 is in the set of {arg0, arg1, arg2}.
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "arg0"
- "arg1"
- "arg2"
The above would be executed in the kernel as
arg == arg0 OR arg == arg1 OR arg == arg2
In case of NotEqual the following YAML snippet matches if the argument at
index 0 is not in the set of {arg0, arg1}.
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "NotEqual"
values:
- "arg0"
- "arg1"
The above would be executed in the kernel as
arg != arg0 AND arg != arg1
The operator type Mask performs and bitwise operation on the argument value
and defined values. The argument type needs to be one of the value types.
For example in following YAML snippet we match second argument for bits
1 and 9 (0x200 value). We could use single value 0x201 as well.
matchArgs:
- index: 2
operator: "Mask"
values:
- 1
- 0x200
The above would be executed in the kernel as
The value can be specified as hexadecimal (with 0x prefix) octal (with 0 prefix)
or decimal value (no prefix).
The operator Prefix checks if the certain argument starts with the defined value,
while the operator Postfix compares if the argument matches to the defined value
as trailing.
The operators relating to ports, addresses and protocol are used with sock, skb,
sockaddr and socket
types. Port operators can accept a range of ports specified as min:max as well
as lists of individual ports. Address operators can accept IPv4/6 CIDR ranges as well
as lists of individual addresses.
The Protocol operator can accept integer values to match against, or the equivalent
IPPROTO_ enumeration. For example, UDP can be specified as either IPPROTO_UDP or 17;
TCP can be specified as either IPPROTO_TCP or 6.
The Family operator can accept integer values to match against or the equivalent
AF_ enumeration. For example, IPv4 can be specified as either AF_INET or 2; IPv6
can be specified as either AF_INET6 or 10.
The State operator can accept integer values to match against or the equivalent
TCP_ enumeration. For example, an established socket can be matched with
TCP_ESTABLISHED or 1; a closed socket with TCP_CLOSE or 7.
The InRange and NotInRange operators accept integer values that are within the
specified range or NOT respectively. The range interval is specified with : separating
minimum and maximum value and includes both values as part of range.
For example following YAML snippet we match all values that are NOT 1,2,3,4 or 5.
matchArgs:
- index: 2
operator: "NotInRange"
values:
- 1:5
In case of matchPIDs:
The operator types In and NotIn are used to test whether the pid of a
system call is found in the provided values list in the CR. Both In and
NotIn are set operations, which means if multiple values are specified they
are ORd together in case of In and ANDd together in case of NotIn.
For example, in case of In the following YAML snippet matches if the pid of a
certain system call is being part of the list of {0, 1}:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: In
followForks: true
isNamespacePID: true
values:
- 0
- 1
The above would be executed in the kernel as
In case of NotIn the following YAML snippet matches if the pid of a certain
system call is not being part of the list of {0, 1}:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: NotIn
followForks: true
isNamespacePID: true
values:
- 0
- 1
The above would be executed in the kernel as
In case of matchBinaries:
The In operator type is used to test whether a binary name of a system call
is found in the provided values list. For example, the following YAML snippet
matches if the binary name of a certain system call is being part of the list
of {binary0, binary1, binary2}:
- matchBinaries:
- operator: "In"
values:
- "binary0"
- "binary1"
- "binary2"
Multiple selectors
When multiple selectors are configured they are logically ORd together.
selectors:
- matchPIDs:
- operator: In
followForks: true
values:
- pid1
- pid2
- pid3
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- 1
- index: 2
operator: "lt"
values:
- 500
- matchPIDs:
- operator: In
followForks: true
values:
- pid1
- pid2
- pid3
matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- 2
The above would be executed in kernel as:
(pid in {pid1, pid2, pid3} AND arg0=1 AND arg2 < 500) OR
(pid in {pid1, pid2, pid3} AND arg0=2)
Limitations
Those limitations might be outdated, see issue #709.
Because BPF must be bounded we have to place limits on how many selectors can
exist.
- Max Selectors 8.
- Max PID values per selector 4
- Max MatchArgs per selector 5 (one per index)
- Max MatchArg Values per MatchArgs 1 (limiting initial implementation can bump
to 16 or so)
Return Actions filter
Return actions filters are a list of actions that execute when an return selector
matches. They are defined under matchReturnActions and currently support all
the Actions filter action types.
7 - Kubernetes Identity Aware Policies
Tetragon in-kernel filtering based on Kubernetes namespaces, pod labels, and container fields
Motivation
Tetragon is configured via TracingPolicies. Broadly
speaking, TracingPolicies define what situations Tetragon should react to and how. The what
can be, for example, specific system calls with specific argument values. The how defines what
action the Tetragon agent should perform when the specified situation occurs. The most common action
is generating an event, but there are others (e.g., returning an error without executing the function
or killing the corresponding process).
Here, we discuss how to apply tracing policies only on a subset of pods running on the system via
the followings mechanisms:
- namespaced policies
- pod-label filters
- container field filters
Tetragon implements these mechanisms in-kernel via eBPF. This is important for both observability
and enforcement use-cases.
For observability, copying only the relevant events from kernel- to user-space reduces overhead. For
enforcement, performing the enforcement action in the kernel avoids the race-condition of doing it
in user-space. For example, let us consider the case where we want to block an application from
performing a system call. Performing the filtering in-kernel means that the application will never
finish executing the system call, which is not possible if enforcement happens in user-space
(after the fact).
To ensure that namespaced tracing policies are always correctly applied, Tetragon needs to perform
actions before containers start executing. Tetragon supports this via OCI runtime
hooks. If
such hooks are not added, Tetragon will apply policies in a best-effort manner using information
from the k8s API server.
Namespace filtering
For namespace filtering we use TracingPolicyNamespaced which has the same contents as a
TracingPolicy, but it is defined in a specific namespace and it is only applied to pods of that
namespace.
Pod label filters
For pod label filters, we use the PodSelector field of tracing policies to select the pods that
the policy is applied to.
Container field filters
For container field filters, we use the containerSelector field of tracing policies to select the containers that the policy is applied to. At the moment, the only supported fields are name and repo which refers to the container repository.
Demo
Setup
For this demo, we use containerd and configure appropriate run-time hooks using minikube.
First, let us start minikube, build and load images, and install Tetragon and OCI hooks:
minikube start --container-runtime=containerd
./contrib/tetragon-rthooks/scripts/minikube-install-hook.sh
make image image-operator
minikube image load --daemon=true cilium/tetragon:latest cilium/tetragon-operator:latest
minikube ssh -- sudo mount bpffs -t bpf /sys/fs/bpf
helm install --namespace kube-system \
--set tetragonOperator.image.override=cilium/tetragon-operator:latest \
--set tetragon.image.override=cilium/tetragon:latest \
--set tetragon.grpc.address="unix:///var/run/cilium/tetragon/tetragon.sock" \
tetragon ./install/kubernetes/tetragon
Once the tetragon pod is up and running, we can get its name and store it in a variable for convenience.
tetragon_pod=$(kubectl -n kube-system get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/name=tetragon -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name --no-headers)
Once the tetragon operator pod is up and running, we can also get its name and store it in a variable for convenience.
tetragon_operator=$(kubectl -n kube-system get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/name=tetragon-operator -o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name --no-headers)
Next, we check the tetragon-operator logs and tetragon agent logs to ensure
that everything is in order.
First, we check if the operator installed the TracingPolicyNamespaced CRD.
kubectl -n kube-system logs -c tetragon-operator $tetragon_operator
The expected output is:
level=info msg="Tetragon Operator: " subsys=tetragon-operator
level=info msg="CRD (CustomResourceDefinition) is installed and up-to-date" name=TracingPolicy/v1alpha1 subsys=k8s
level=info msg="Creating CRD (CustomResourceDefinition)..." name=TracingPolicyNamespaced/v1alpha1 subsys=k8s
level=info msg="CRD (CustomResourceDefinition) is installed and up-to-date" name=TracingPolicyNamespaced/v1alpha1 subsys=k8s
level=info msg="Initialization complete" subsys=tetragon-operator
Next, we check that policyfilter (the low-level mechanism that implements the desired functionality) is indeed enabled.
kubectl -n kube-system logs -c tetragon $tetragon_pod
The output should include:
level=info msg="Enabling policy filtering"
Namespaced policies
For illustration purposes, we will use the lseek system call with an invalid
argument. Specifically a file descriptor (the first argument) of -1. Normally,
this operation would return a “Bad file descriptor error”.
Let us start a pod in the default namespace:
kubectl -n default run test --image=python -it --rm --restart=Never -- python
Above command will result in the following python shell:
If you don't see a command prompt, try pressing enter.
>>>
There is no policy installed, so attempting to do the lseek operation will just
return an error. Using the python shell, we can execute an lseek and see the
returned error.
>>> import os
>>> os.lseek(-1,0,0)
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
OSError: [Errno 9] Bad file descriptor
>>>
In another terminal, we install a policy in the default namespace:
cat << EOF | kubectl apply -n default -f -
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicyNamespaced
metadata:
name: "lseek-namespaced"
spec:
kprobes:
- call: "sys_lseek"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "-1"
matchActions:
- action: Sigkill
EOF
The above tracing policy will kill the process that performs a lseek system call with a file
descriptor of -1. Note that we use a SigKill action only for illustration purposes because it’s
easier to observe its effects.
Then, attempting the lseek operation on the previous terminal, will result in the process getting
killed:
>>> os.lseek(-1, 0, 0)
pod "test" deleted
pod default/test terminated (Error)
The same is true for a newly started container:
kubectl -n default run test --image=python -it --rm --restart=Never -- python
If you don't see a command prompt, try pressing enter.
>>> import os
>>> os.lseek(-1, 0, 0)
pod "test" deleted
pod default/test terminated (Error)
Doing the same on another namespace:
kubectl create namespace test
kubectl -n test run test --image=python -it --rm --restart=Never -- python
Will not kill the process and result in an error:
If you don't see a command prompt, try pressing enter.
>>> import os
>>> os.lseek(-1, 0, 0)
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
OSError: [Errno 9] Bad file descriptor
Pod label filters
Let’s install a tracing policy with a pod label filter.
cat << EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "lseek-podfilter"
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: "lseek-test"
kprobes:
- call: "sys_lseek"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "-1"
matchActions:
- action: Sigkill
EOF
Pods without the label will not be affected:
kubectl run test --image=python -it --rm --restart=Never -- python
If you don't see a command prompt, try pressing enter.
>>> import os
>>> os.lseek(-1, 0, 0)
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
OSError: [Errno 9] Bad file descriptor
>>>
But pods with the label will:
kubectl run test --labels "app=lseek-test" --image=python -it --rm --restart=Never -- python
If you don't see a command prompt, try pressing enter.
>>> import os
>>> os.lseek(-1, 0, 0)
pod "test" deleted
pod default/test terminated (Error)
Container field filters
Let’s install a tracing policy with a container field filter.
cat << EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
name: "lseek-containerfilter"
spec:
containerSelector:
matchExpressions:
- key: name
operator: In
values:
- main
kprobes:
- call: "sys_lseek"
syscall: true
args:
- index: 0
type: "int"
selectors:
- matchArgs:
- index: 0
operator: "Equal"
values:
- "-1"
matchActions:
- action: Sigkill
EOF
Let’s create a pod with 2 containers:
cat << EOF | kubectl apply -f -
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: lseek-pod
spec:
containers:
- name: main
image: python
command: ['sh', '-c', 'sleep infinity']
- name: sidecar
image: python
command: ['sh', '-c', 'sleep infinity']
EOF
Containers that don’t match the name main will not be affected:
kubectl exec -it lseek-pod -c sidecar -- python3
>>> import os
>>> os.lseek(-1, 0, 0)
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
OSError: [Errno 9] Bad file descriptor
>>>
But containers matching the name main will:
kubectl exec -it lseek-pod -c main -- python3
>>> import os
>>> os.lseek(-1, 0, 0)
command terminated with exit code 137